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Abstract 
 
The European Union sees itself as a global force for human rights, but there is the perception 
that its international statements are not always matched by internal policies. This paper seeks to 
provide a partial explanation of the gap between the EU’s self-perception and its external image, by 
comparing, from a legal perspective, the EU’s external promotion of human rights and the internal 
policies of its members. The analysis suggests that EU states’ practice sometimes contradicts the 
values promoted throughout the rest of the world by the Union. This inconsistency may call into 
question the EU’s image as a distinctive international actor and jeopardise its effectiveness on the 
global scene. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has gradually come to define itself in terms of the promotion of 
fundamental rights and democratic freedoms.
1
 It even labels itself a ‘global force for human 
rights’.
2
 Academics also depict the EU as a ‘distinctive’ entity and as a ‘normative power’: it is 
often argued that the EU has caused its external relations to be informed by a catalogue of norms 
which come closer to international human rights instruments than most other actors in world 
politics.
3
  
However, the literature on the external perception of the Union suggests that the EU’s image 
is not one of great distinctiveness: foreign citizens, media and the elite seldom acknowledge the 
Union’s normative character.
4
 The perception of the EU as less of a normative power depends in 
part on the inconsistency of its own policies. For example, the EU seeks to eradicate poverty via 
development cooperation but has a less than development-friendly stance in its agricultural policy.
5
 
Moreover, the EU’s action appears not to qualify as normative because it is affected by ‘double 
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standards’; for instance, the image of the EU as a democracy and human rights promoter in the 
Middle East is weakened by the observation of the EU’s soft response to Israel’s violations of 
human rights.
6
  
The discrepancy between internal depictions and external perceptions of the EU’s identity 
may also depend on a third inconsistency, which is often overlooked: the contradiction between the 
principles of the EU foreign affairs and member states’ actions. Since knowledge of the EU remains 
rather low outside of Europe,
7
 the actions of EU members are likely to influence the image of the 
whole Union. It is fair to assume, therefore, that whenever member states do not respect the norms 
supported by the Union, the entire EU may appear inconsistent and scarcely credible.   
This kind of inconsistency is very problematic in the field of human rights. The external 
promotion of human rights is one of the elements that define the EU’s international identity, yet the 
Union lacks the power to promote those rights internally: the EU does not have, in general terms, 
the power to protect fundamental rights from the action of its own member states. In other words, 
the EU can contribute to defining what passes for ‘normal’ at the international level but does not 
have the power to do so within Europe. Therefore, one may wonder whether the EU affirms, in its 
external relations, that certain restrictions to human rights are unwarranted, even if the same 
restrictions may be lawful when applied by its members. 
This paper seeks to investigate the consistency of EU and member states’ human rights 
policies by comparing their interpretation of human rights in external and internal actions, 
respectively. Since it would be impossible to provide for a holistic account of the EU’s promotion 
of human rights, this paper focuses on some areas that may be representative of trends in European 
human rights policies. Considering that the objective of this analysis is to verify whether EU and 
member states’ policies contradict one another, this paper refers to external action ‘consistency’ in 
its literal sense, that is, the ability of several propositional contents to be asserted together without 
logical contradiction.
8
 
This study consists of three sections. The first one presents the analytical framework of the 
analysis, i.e. the requirement of consistency between internal and external human rights policies. 
The second addresses the main contradiction between EU and member states’ human rights 
policies: the external promotion of rights that are not recognised as valid within all of Europe. The 
third section studies another form of inconsistency: the different interpretation of human rights in 
EU foreign affairs and member states’ internal policies. The results of the investigation are 
summarised in the conclusion, which also suggests a solution for the contradiction between EU and 
member states’ policies.  
 
2. On the Requirement of Consistency Between Internal and External Human Rights 
Policies 
 
The evaluation of the consistency between EU external values and member states’ actions 
can be performed by assessing whether the Union and its members conceive of human rights in the 
same manner. It is necessary, therefore, to identify the main sources of human rights in EU and 
member states' laws, and subsequently compare them. 
Human rights rules applicable in the member states are contained mainly in internal laws 
and case-law, as well as in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
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Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or Convention), which has been ratified by all EU member states. 
In some cases, the exact content and limits of human rights may be controversial, since EU states 
have different approaches to this issue. This paper uses the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) to clarify the meaning of the ECHR and, thus, the limits of the 
member states’ discretion in regulating human rights. It is worth noting that certain non-EU states 
(e.g. Turkey) are part of the ECHR. The analysis also takes into consideration the ECtHR 
judgements concerning non-EU states, since they provide an interpretation of ECHR rules 
applicable to EU members.  
The sources of human rights in EU law are varied. According to Article 6 of the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU), the Union respects human rights, as enumerated by: i) the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter: Charter), which has the same legal value 
as the Treaties and ii) the general principles of the Union’s law, which contain rights resulting from 
the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to the member states. 
Although the EU must respect fundamental rights, it has almost no internal human rights 
policy. The requirement to respect fundamental rights – as provided for in Union law – is binding 
on the member states only when they act within the scope of EU law.
9
 In other circumstances, there 
is little the Union can do, at the moment, to make sure that its members respect human rights.
10
  
At the same time, human rights are crucial for EU foreign affairs. According to Article 3(5) 
of the TEU, in its relations with the wider world, the Union must uphold and promote ‘its values” 
and must contribute to ‘the protection of human rights.” Similarly, Article 21 of the TEU stipulates 
that ‘the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation,” including ‘the universality and indivisibility of human rights.’ 
Even when it is established that the EU must promote human rights, a problem remains: 
which rights should the Union promote? In theory, rules governing external action should be read 
together with the provisions on the protection of human rights applicable within the Union, since 
the EU should promote ‘its’ values, including fundamental rights.
11
 This means that the EU should 
promote the same rights it respects. These rights are, generally speaking, the same rights that are 
protected by the member states. As noted above, the fundamental rights contained in the general 
principles of EU law stem from the constitutional traditions common to the member states and an 
international agreement binding EU countries (the ECHR). Even the rights contained in the Charter 
of Fundamental rights generally originate at the member states’ level: most rights contained in this 
instrument stem from the ECHR or the constitutional traditions common to the member states
12
 and 
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should be interpreted accordingly, pursuant to Article 52 of the Charter. Therefore, the human rights 
the EU respects and promotes abroad are, generally speaking, the same rights the member states 
must protect in Europe.  
It might be argued that the link between EU and member states' obligations in the field of 
human rights should foster consistency among their respective policies. However, given the absence 
of a uniform concept of human rights in European societies, one may wonder whether EU external 
action can truly mirror values that are common to all the member states. The following sections 
seek to demonstrate that the EU affirms, in its external relations, that certain restrictions to human 
rights are unwarranted, while the same restrictions are lawful when applied by the member states. 
The next section intends to verify whether the EU promotes rights that are not protected in Europe; 
then the analysis turns to the consistency between the interpretation of rights in EU external action 
and in member states' policies. 
 
3. External Promotion of Rights that Are Not Protected in Europe 
 
The most evident form of contradiction between EU external promotion of human rights and 
member states’ policies takes place when the Union supports certain rights that are not recognised 
as such within Europe.  
A well-known example in this sense is the protection of national minorities. The EU has 
long been committed to promoting the rights of persons belonging to minorities in the rest of the 
world, and mainly in its neighbourhood. Since the 90s this protection has been considered one of 
the requirements for accession to the EU. Pursuant to the Copenhagen conclusions of 1993, EU 
membership ‘requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’.
13
 
Compliance with this requirement is evaluated with reference to various parameters, including the 
ratification and implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, which was concluded in the context of the Council of Europe.
14
 For instance, Decision 
2006/145/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership 
with Croatia affirms that this country should promote ‘respect for and protection of minorities in 
accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the principles laid down in the 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.’
15
 
However, three member states (Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg) have not ratified this 
latter Convention, and France has not even signed it.
16
 One may hypothesise that these states 
probably do not protect all the rights contained in the Framework Convention, since they do not 
always recognise the existence of national minorities within their territories.
17
 The EU’s promotion 
of minorities’ rights, therefore, appears problematic: while the Union preaches respect for the rights 
of national minorities, some EU member states are likely to limit the enjoyment of such rights, 
whose existence they deny.  
Something similar happens with respect to the right to international assistance in case of 
disaster. The International Law Commission (ILC) has been working on the protection of persons in 
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the event of disasters since 2007.
18
 One of the most controversial issues dealt with by the ILC is the 
right to receive international assistance after disasters. Since the right of a person must correspond 
to the obligation of another, the recognition of a human right to international assistance would 
imply corresponding obligations on the part of international subjects. At the very least, the state 
affected by the disaster should seek international assistance whenever the catastrophe exceeds its 
national response capacity.
19
 During the debate on this topic, the EU affirmed that any state affected 
by a disaster is indeed required to seek international assistance if it cannot cope with the disaster.
20
 
A similar position had already been supported by the EU in its external action, as testified by the 
preamble of the EU Instrument for Humanitarian Aid, which affirms that ‘people in distress, victims 
of natural disasters’ have ‘a right to international humanitarian assistance where their own 
authorities prove unable to provide effective relief’.
21
  
Nonetheless, some EU members explicitly contradicted the EU’s position during the 
discussion at the international level. Austria, France, Greece, Portugal and the UK affirmed that 
there can be no duty to seek external assistance, which would entail an interference with state 
sovereignty and which is not supported by any custom or practice.
22
 It would seem, in fact, that EU 
member states’ laws do not take into consideration either a right to international assistance or 
obligations to seek external aid. Similarly, the international agreements entered into by EU 
members normally do not require state parties to seek international assistance.
23
  
In summary, the EU affirms that third states’ refusal to seek external assistance may entail, 
under certain conditions, an unwarranted restriction of human rights. At the same time, the member 
states do not consider themselves as required to seek international help, and might consequently 
apply restrictions to the ‘right’ to international assistance. It is worth noting that European states 
have refused international help in the past: for instance, after the L’Aquila earthquake (2009) the 
Italian Prime Minister affirmed: ‘We thank everyone, but we do not need help from abroad. We are 
a proud people and we will manage alone.’
24
 
 
4. External Promotion of a Different Interpretation of Human Rights 
 
The inconsistency between EU and member states’ policies on human rights is not limited to 
the promotion of rights that do not exist in Europe. In some cases, the Union promotes abroad rights 
that are protected in Europe, but which are interpreted in a different way. This implies that the EU 
affirms that certain restrictions to human rights are unwarranted when enforced by third states, even 
if they can be applied by its own members.  
Freedom of expression provides for an example in this sense. This freedom is protected in 
Europe by Article 10 of the ECHR, whereby: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority.’ The exercise of freedom of expression may, however, ‘be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties’ as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of public safety, ‘for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of 
others’.  
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A typical justification for restrictions on freedom of expression is the protection of 
believers’ sensitivities: to the extent that religious beliefs concern a person’s relationship with the 
metaphysical, they can affect the most intimate feelings and may be so complex that an attack on 
them might allegedly cause a disproportionately severe shock.
25
  In order to protect believers – as 
well as religions – many states have laws prohibiting the disparaging of beliefs. Such laws fall into 
two main categories: i) the laws against ‘religious insult’, i.e. insult based on belonging to a 
particular religion and insult to religious feelings; and ii) the laws against blasphemy, which is 
insulting or showing contempt or lack of reverence for something sacred (including gods).
26
 
Since freedom of expression is a fundamental value for democratic societies, one may 
wonder whether these laws are warranted. The EU has adopted a very clear, and negative, position 
in this respect. During the first decade of the 2000s, several Muslim-majority countries promoted, 
under the umbrella of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a campaign meant to 
convince United Nations members to stipulate an international instrument against what they termed 
as ‘defamation of religion’.
27
 Their argument was that following the theories on the clash of 
civilisations and the attacks of September 11, 2001, there were strong reasons to increase religious 
dialogue and tolerance, and agreed that the defamation of religions measure was a necessary step 
forward.
28
 The EU and its members opposed this campaign, essentially because they considered that 
acknowledging and practicing religious pluralism should include the right of all people to criticize 
the beliefs of others, to discuss and challenge them.
29
 The opposition of the EU, as well as of the US 
and several other states and non-governmental organisations, eventually led the OIC to set aside its 
initiative in 2012.
30
   
The EU Council recently confirmed the EU’s position through the adoption – by unanimity 
– of the Guidelines on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief
31
 and the 
Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline.
32
 These Guidelines are non-binding but 
contain a useful indication as to the interpretation of human rights that is favoured by the Union,
33
 
since they explain ‘international human rights standards’ and give ‘political lines to officials of EU 
institutions and EU member states, to be used in contacts with third countries and with international 
and civil society organisations’.
34
 According to the Guidelines, freedom of religion does not include 
the right to have a belief ‘that is free from criticism or ridicule’: human rights law protects only 
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‘individuals, not religion or belief per se’.
35
 Therefore, the EU opposes the criminalisation of both 
blasphemy and religious insult. It ‘forcefully’ advocates, in particular, against the use of the death 
penalty, physical punishment, or deprivation of liberty as penalties for blasphemy and religious 
insult.
36
   
Notwithstanding the straightforward position of the Union in respect of blasphemy laws, EU 
members limit freedom of expression to protect religious sensitivity. Blasphemy is an offence in six 
EU countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy), and in some cases, it is a crime. 
An even larger number of Union members (Cyprus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain) punish religious insult.
37
 
It is true that the application of these laws has become increasingly rare,
38
 but in some cases they 
are still enforced. In Malta, for instance, there were about 100 convictions for religious insult solely 
in the period of January to September 2012.
39
 A conviction for these crimes may lead to the 
deprivation of liberty for a period up to six months.
40
 Poland also enforces laws on religious insult, 
which may lead to serious consequences, including deprivation of liberty for two years.
41
 Greece is 
in a similar situation, since it punishes any public and malicious blasphemy against God with a 
maximum of two years in prison. During the last few years, several individuals have been 
criminally punished in Greece for their ‘offensive’ works.
42
  
It is important to note that the laws on religious insult and blasphemy are compatible with 
European human rights law. According to the ECtHR, if a religion is criticised or insulted, believers 
may ‘legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted and offensive attacks’.
43
 
European states can therefore limit freedom of expression to protect the feelings of believers. States 
enjoy a broad margin of appreciation in this ambit, since it is not possible to discern throughout 
Europe a uniform conception of the significance of religion in society and it is also not possible ‘to 
arrive at a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise 
of the right to freedom of expression where such expression is directed against the religious feelings 
of others’.
44
 Since there is as yet not sufficient common ground in the legal and social orders of the 
member states to conclude that blasphemy laws are incompatible with the Convention,
45
 European 
states can criminalise religious insult and blasphemy.  
In summary, the EU affirms that third states cannot restrict freedom of expression for the 
purpose of protecting religious sensitivities, while its members can, and actually do, limit freedom 
of speech to protect the sensitivity of believers. It may be argued that the European contradictions 
on blasphemy laws call into question the legitimacy of the Union as an exporter of norms. As noted 
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by Reporters Without Borders, ‘It is not very coherent to ask another country to carry out a 
thorough review of its blasphemy laws while continuing to accept the existence of a law in Ireland 
that criminalises blasphemy.’
46
 The European contradictions may also threaten the EU’s credibility: 
‘When internal policies contradict external guidelines, who’s going to take the latter seriously?’
47
  
Finally, European contradictions may jeopardise the EU’s effectiveness on the international 
scene. In 2009, Pakistan submitted a proposal to the UN Ad hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 
Complementary Standards, according to which state parties should have prohibited by law ‘the 
uttering of matters that are grossly abusive or insulting in relation to matters held sacred by any 
religion thereby causing outrage among a substantial number of the adherents to that religion’.
48
 
The EU was quite embarrassed by this proposal, since it reproduced almost to the letter part of the 
‘Defamation Act 2009’, which the Irish Parliament had approved only a few months earlier.
49
 In 
other words, a third state took advantage of European contradictions to unmask the EU’s 
‘hypocrisy’,
50
 to legitimise its own position and to further its agenda.
51
     
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The European Union sees itself as a ‘global force for human rights’, but there is the 
perception that the EU’s international statements are not always matched by internal policies. This 
paper sought to provide a partial explanation of the gap between the EU’s self perception and its 
external image, by focussing on human rights promotion and protection.  
The analysis shows that EU member states adopt human rights standards that are different 
from those the Union claims to promote abroad. Although the EU preaches that third states should 
protect the rights of minorities, some member states do not recognise the existence of those rights. 
The Union similarly claims that states affected by disasters should seek external assistance 
whenever they cannot cope with emergencies, while EU members are not bound by any obligation 
in this sense. Finally, while the Union considers that freedom of expression implies a right to 
criticise religion, several Union members prohibit ‘blasphemy’ and ‘religious insult’.  
Given the limited knowledge of the EU in third countries, the inconsistency between EU and 
member states’ policies may easily be perceived as a contradiction of the Union as such. This 
perception hardly promotes the EU’s credibility as a changer of norms in the international system. 
On the contrary, it is likely to convey the image of a hypocritical subject. Thus, the inconsistency 
between the EU’s foreign policy and individual member states’ internal actions may help to explain 
why external observers often do not perceive the Union as a ‘distinctive’ international player.  
The perception of the Union as an inconsistent promoter of human rights may have serious 
repercussions on the EU’s effectiveness at the global level. Other countries can stigmatise the EU’s 
contradictions, as Pakistan did in 2009 during the debate on the defamation of religion. Not only 
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does this reinforce the EU’s image as a ‘hypocritical’ player but may also weaken the European 
stance as a whole. Europe can hardly define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics when its 
statements and practice convey different messages as to what is ‘normal’. Inconsistency may thus 
decrease third countries’ tendencies to follow the Union.
52
 Future research may elucidate other 
contradictions between EU and member states’ policy on human rights and it may provide further 
insight into the practical consequences of EU’s inconsistencies for its effectiveness on the global 
stage. 
In theory, the European inconsistency can be solved by bringing EU external policy in line 
with states’ internal practice. Such course of action, however, may nullify the EU’s efforts as a 
norm-setter: if the EU had followed its members during the debate on the defamation of religion it 
would have had to side with Pakistan or, at least, it would have had to remain silent. It may be 
advisable, therefore, to explore a second solution - that is, bringing the member states’ policies in 
line with the EU’s external policy. After all, the EU’s position is determined by the member states’ 
representatives within the Council. It is only natural that, by defining what is ‘normal’ in world 
politics, European states should also define what is ‘normal’ in Europe.  
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